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Abstract - Calculating the economic value that a CEO 
contributes to the worth of a corporation is seemingly a moot 
point. The standard method of calculation is the use of financial 
ratios, the firm’s stock price and to what degree were the overall 
objectives of the enterprise accomplished.  The purpose of this 
quantitative research project was to investigate if any significant 
relationship existed between the annual salaries of the CEOs of 
48 publically traded firms in the State of Wisconsin, USA and 
increases/decreases in the price of their corporations’ stock price 
and net revenue. The author of this study selected the State of 
Wisconsin as the basis for the study due to the number of 
Fortune 1000 firms (25 the 16th highest in the United States) and 
Fortune 500 companies (10). Some prominent firms include 
Fiserv, Harley-Davidson, Johnson Controls, Kohl’s, Manpower, 
Oshkosh Corporation and Rockwell Automation. The outcomes 
of this research revealed that there was no statistically significant 
relationship between increases/decreases in the price of 
Wisconsin’s publically traded corporations’ stock price and net 
revenue in 2008. However, in 2010 while there was no statistically 
significant correlation between the compensation of corporate 
executives of 48 publically traded firms in Wisconsin and 
increases/decreases in the price of their corporations’ stock price 
there was a statistically significant correlation between the 
compensation of these executives and the net incomes of their 
firms. Finally, three Wisconsin CEOs were ranked among the top 
250 highest CEO/Pay ratios in America. 
 
Index Terms – Executive Compensation, Firm Economic 
Performance, Valuation of Corporations, Management Theory. 
 
1. Introduction 
CEO salaries have increased significantly over the past 
several decades in the United States.  The average CEO pay of 
companies in the S&P 500 Index rose to $12.94 million in 
2011 and CEO pay in the S&P 500 Index increased 13.9 
percent in 2011, following a 22.8 percent increase in 2010. 
The ratio of CEO-to-worker pay between CEOs of the S&P 
500 Index companies and U.S. workers widened to 380 times 
in 2011 from 343 times in 2010. Back in 1980, the average 
large company CEO only received 42 times the average 
worker's pay (AFLCIO, 2012, para. 1).  
 
During the course of the Great Recession (2007 – 2009) and 
sluggish economic recovery, widespread attention is being 
paid to executive compensation and the performance of their 
corporation. Despite the innumerable compensation schemes 
available to assess the outcomes of an enterprise, the question 
remains: do the actions of a single CEO have a direct 
association to corporate results? Four themes  are explored in 
the Literature Review; management’s impact on corporate 
performance, CEO compensation trends, CEO and employee 
pay disparities and an assessment of CEO compensation 
developments in Wisconsin. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
A. Management’s Impact on Corporate Performance 
 
An influential study by Bloom and Van Reenen (2006) of 
more than 700 manufacturing companies in Great Britain, 
France, Germany and the United States found that the 
approach taken by corporate leaders was the foremost 
management influence on enterprise performance. Those firms 
with superior management were associated with higher 
productivity, return on equity and market capitalization. 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) followed their study of 700 
European firms with expanded research that encompassed 
more than 4,000 American, European and Asian businesses. 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) research further reinforced 
their 2006 findings. They found that there was no single 
management practice that provided the key to improved 
corporate performance.  Rather, it was the average score of 18 
management practices grouped into “four areas: operations 
(three practices), monitoring (five practices), targets (five 
practices), and incentives (five practices)” (p. 1361) when 
compared to an enterprise’s economic success that provided 
the most accurate indicator of success. One micro study 
(Keller, 2009) was conducted to apply Bloom and Van 
Reenen’s methodology in southeast Wisconsin in late 2008. 
The results from this study showed that management practices 
did not have a statistically significant impact on the economic 
performance of for-profit firms with the exception of one 
(family owned) ownership type. 
A further issue that has clouded the topic of evaluating the 
impact that management has on firm or organizational 
performance is the lack of a precise definition of performance. 
Folan, Browne and Jagdev (2007) argued that there is no 
precise definition of the meaning of performance in the 
context of management science and as a result financial 
measurements continue to be the default indicators of 
managerial quality. Moorcroft (2005) posed an incendiary 
query relative to the influence, let alone the rewards, of 
executive leaders.   
 
Can you honestly subscribe to the view that the Chair 
of a major corporation really influences the 
operational decisions of an employee in another 
country? Employees react to line management and 
the systems that they interact with daily, not to 
distant executives – even to the extent of staying in, 
or leaving, the organization. (p. 4) 
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Moorcroft’s inquiry about the effect that senior leaders have 
on a corporation is provocative. Frequently, the CEO (like a 
military general) is hailed and remunerated generously for the 
outcomes of their company. However, dazzling the corporate 
level plan may be, inevitably an enterprise’s employees must 
deliver the firm’s outputs to customers. Compensation for 
employees are generally predetermined by salary schedules 
and limited performance bonuses generally designed using 
Taylor/Fayol/Six Sigma-like production measurements. 
Executive level rewards on the other hand are negotiable and 
seemingly limitless in their latitude. Unlike those who they 
lead; measuring the direct connection between the CEO’s 
singular impact on overall corporate consequences is opaque. 
The challenge to quantity the effectiveness of any company’s 
performance is complex and subjective. Nonetheless, the 
foremost benchmarks of CEO performance are financial and 
accounting calculations. Examining the utility and voracity of 
the association between compensating CEOs based on 
commonly accepted financial benchmarks was part of focus of 
this micro study.    
 
B. CEO Compensation Trends 
 
The search for a meaningful compensation plan to both 
motivate CEO performance and corporate outcomes has been 
an ongoing topic for compensation committees and scholars. 
What incentives are optimal to motivate a CEO to 
simultaneously increase their personal wealth and shareholder 
prosperity? It follows that if CEO salaries are tied to increases 
in the company’s stock price, the former should drive the 
latter. The literature is unclear in this matter. For example 
Boyd (1994) found that CEO compensation was not 
significantly related to firm size or profitability. Many 
remuneration systems are in use to secure the connection 
between CEO pay and the value of the firm’s stock ranging 
from generous salaries, PERKS, stock options and others. 
Larker and Tayan (2012) analyzed data from 2006 to 2012 and 
found that of the largest public companies, a 50% gain in 
share price led to a median wealth gain of six times a CEO's 
annual compensation due to leverage in the form of stock 
options. One of the questions raised by Larker and Tayan’s 
research was the degree to which risk and risk aversion may 
influence a CEO’s (based on years of service) decisions. How 
corporate compensation committees choose to reward and 
incentivize corporate leaders is a matter of much study and 
dispute.  
 
A study conducted by The Wall Street Journal and 
the Hay Group found a stronger link between CEO 
pay and their companies’ financial results. 
Meanwhile, the 2012 S&P 500 CEO PayStudy from 
Equilar found that executive pay rose 6.8 percent 
between 2010 and 2011, along with more emphasis 
on equity and performance, and an analysis of 500 
large U.S. public companies by Forbes magazine 
found that CEO pay increased 16 percent. 
(Bloomberg BNA, 2012, p.1) 
 
Using history as a predictor of future success has been 
questioned by some researchers. Banker, Darrough, Rong and 
Plehn-Dujowich (2013) evaluated the effect of past 
performance on CEO compensation and found that:  
past performance measures play different roles in 
determining salary and bonus. Specifically, the past 
ROE and the past RET are both positively and 
significantly associated with salary. In contrast, we 
find that bonus is negatively associated with the past 
ROE. When the salary and bonus components are 
combined, total cash compensation is unrelated to 
past performance, apparently because the positive 
effect in the salary equation and the negative effect in 
the bonus equation offset each other. (p. 25) 
 
A variety of trends to realign executive compensation given 
the post-2008 Great Recession economy are being 
contemplated. One study (Henderson, Masli, Richardson & 
Sanchez, 2010) provided confirmation that a “significant 
substitution in CEO compensation—away from bonus and 
toward equity compensation in response to increasing 
magnitude of layoffs” (p. 741).  Correlating stock performance 
to CEO compensation continues to be the standard used most 
frequently by corporate compensation committees to drive 
shareholder wealth and is the basis of this study.  
 
C. CEO/Employee Compensation Disparities 
 
As the American economy slowly recovers from one of the 
worst recessions in its modern history, unemployment rates 
continue to slowly decline. In April, 2013 the unemployment 
rate in the United States was 7.5% (the lowest since 2009) 
(United States Department of Labor (2013). The State of 
Wisconsin reported an unemployment rate of 7.6% in March, 
2013 (State of Wisconsin, 2013). While the prospects of 
employment and structural economic growth are welcome as 
signs of pay gains for citizens; a compensation disparity 
between those who occupy executive level positions and their 
subordinates continues to ominously grow.  It was reported 
that between 2010 and 2011 American CEOs averaged 
double-digit increases. In part the upturn was attributed to 
rising stock prices resulting in 15% pay enlargements for the 
average American CEO in 2011 and a typical compensation 
package hitting $5.8 million which followed an average pay 
upsurge of 28% in 2010. For employees, ordinary wage gains 
were unremarkable. The typical increase in base pay for non-
executive employees was 3% in 2012. Inflation averaged 
about 2.7% (Guardian, 2012).  
The gap between executive pay and typical worker 
household income has been an issue attracting significant 
interest over the past several decades. According to the 
Economic Policy Institute: 
 
In 1978, compensation of CEOs was 35 times greater 
than compensation of average workers. Since then,  
this ratio has skyrocketed, peaking at 299-to-1 in 
2000. During the Great Recession, CEO pay fell 
relative to pay of typical workers because much of 
CEO compensation is directly linked to the stock 
market, which fell sharply in 2008 and 2009. 
However, the ratio bounced back during the recovery 
and stood at 243-to-1 in 2010. (Economic Policy 
Institute, 2011, para. 2)  
 
Bloomberg (2013) noted that across the S&P 500 Index of 
firms, “the average multiple of CEO compensation to that of 
rank-and-file workers is 204, up 20 percent since 2009” (para. 
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3). The Bloomberg research ranked the former CEO of JC 
Penny, who was dismissed due to several years of a failed 
revitalization campaign, at the top of the pay/ratio with a 
compensation package valued at 1,795 times that of an hourly 
wage earner at JC Penny. 
 
The inclusion of ethics and agency problem regarding how 
executive compensation is calculated and negotiated adds 
depth to the discussion. Moriarty (2009) asserted that CEOs 
have an economic and moral fiduciary responsibility to not 
overpay themselves; just as they would not overpay for labor 
or resources. Moriarty’s moral imperative posits that if CEOs 
demand and accept excessive pay packages they act in self-
interest rather than in the best interest of their their firm’s 
shareholders. However; Kolb (2012) maintained that the 
executive who recuses themself from involvement in the 
compensation decision making process is “morally free to 
negotiate for the highest wage available” (p. 679).  Bebchuk 
and Fried (2003) identified the agency problem regarding 
executive compensation succinctly. They argue that the boards 
of directors of publically traded enterprises, whose members 
are geographically scattered and many are simultaneously 
involved in running their own companies, cannot avoid 
negotiating in consultation with CEOs. Consequently 
executives assert considerable guidance over their 
compensation packages and therefore “have an interest in 
reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent 
to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance” 
(abstract). 
 
D. An Assessment of CEO Compensation Developments in 
Wisconsin 
In 2010 the typical pay for Wisconsin corporate CEOs 
increased by 27%. That year Wisconsin’s publically traded 
firms paid their chief executives more than $237 million. The 
CEO of the state’s largest public company was given a 53% 
pay increase raising his pay to $17.6 million. The average pay 
for a CEO of a publically traded Wisconsin company was $3.8 
million. In contrast the average worker in Wisconsin made 
$39,104 down from $39,156 the previous year, according to 
the state Department of Workforce Development (Jsonline, 
2011). The pay disparity between Wisconsin CEOs to the 
average employee was 99: 1, a significantly lower pay 
differential than national averages. It should be noted that 
according to Bloomberg (2013) three Wisconsin CEOs ranked 
in the top 250 highest CEO Pay Raito list; Stephen Roell (#42 
@ 409:1) Johnson Controls; Kevin Mansell (#83 @ 317:1) 
and Keith Nosbusch (#213 @ 196:1) Rockwell Automation. 
Of the 57 firms, 37 (79%) recorded a profit however, only four 
(2.28%) CEOs experienced a pay reduction averaging 19%.  
The debate about CEO pay and the justifications made for 
large remuneration packages was played out in the local 
media. "CEOs live in their own bubble universe said Stephen 
Rose, research professor and senior economist at the 
Georgetown University Center on Education and the 
Workforce. They are really outside the law of supply and 
demand." An opposing view was offered by a University of 
Wisconsin academician who opined: "If you want to pay 20% 
below the average for your CEO, who exactly are you going to 
get?" asked Barry Gerhart, a professor of management at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. "Sure, they're not going to 
be chopped liver, but is that the strategy you want to follow? 
That's the position the boards are in" (Jsonline, 2011, paras 8-
11).  
To accomplish the goal of this quantitative research project 
to determine if a relationship existed between the annual 
salaries of the CEOs of 48 publically traded firms in the State 
of Wisconsin, USA and increases/decreases in the value of 
their corporations’ stock price and net revenue a critical 
review of the relevant peer-reviewed and scholarly literature 
was conducted. The type of data collected for this study was 
from publically available sources that listed the salaries of the 
CEOs of publically traded firms located in the state of 
Wisconsin. The population was limited to 48 publically traded 
corporations as detailed information about these firms is 
readily available. The author of this study selected Wisconsin 
as the focus of this micro-study because he resides in the state 
and the number of Fortune 1000 firms (25 – 16th highest in the 
United States) and Fortune 500 companies (10) provide a 
reasonable sample of American industries. 
 
III.    Methodology 
 
The problem addressed in this part of the quantitative micro-
study was to determine if a relationship existed between the 
annual salaries of the CEOs of 48 publically traded firms in 
the State of Wisconsin and increases/decreases in the value of 
their corporations’ stock price and net revenue.  
H1o. There is no statistically significant relationship 
between the annual salaries of the CEOs of 48 publically 
traded firms in the State of Wisconsin, USA and 
increases/decreases in the price of their corporations’ stock 
prices in 2008. 
H2o. There is no statistically significant relationship 
between the annual salaries of the CEOs of 48 publically 
traded firms in the State of Wisconsin, USA and 
increases/decreases in the net revenues of their corporations’ 
in 2008. 
H3o. There is no statistically significant relationship 
between the annual salaries of the CEOs of 48 publically 
traded firms in the State of Wisconsin, USA and 
increases/decreases in the price of their corporations’ stock 
prices in 2010. 
H4o. There is no statistically significant relationship 
between the annual salaries of the CEOs of 48 publically 
traded firms in the State of Wisconsin, USA and 
increases/decreases in the net revenues of their corporations in 
2010. 
The type of data collected for this study was accumulated 
from publically available sources. The population was limited 
to 48 publically traded corporations. The total population of 
publically traded firms in Wisconsin is 57; however for the 
purpose of this research nine firms that were not publically 
traded in 2008 or enterprises that experienced a change in 
corporate leadership during the period of study were excluded. 
The Null Hypotheses were analyzed using a t-Test-Paired Two 
Sample for Means. A .05 level of significance was used to 
determine the significance for each of the Null Hypotheses. 
 
A. Findings: Hypothesis 1 
 
The researcher used a t-Test-Paired Two Sample for Means 
to analyze the data. A .05 level of significance was used to 
determine whether to accept or reject Hypothesis 1: There is 
no statistically significant relationship between the annual 
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salaries of the CEOs of 48 publically traded firms in the State 
of Wisconsin, USA and increases/decreases in the price of 
their corporations’ stock prices in 2008. It was determined that 
there is no correlation between the annual salaries of the CEOs 
of 48 publically traded firms in the State of Wisconsin, USA 
and increases/decreases in the price of their corporations’ 
stock prices in 2008. With a P (T<=t) two-tail value of 9.51 at 
the .05 level, the Null Hypothesis cannot be rejected (Table 1). 
 
Table 1.  Correlation of CEO Compensation to Stock Price 
2008 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample 





B. Findings: Hypothesis 2 
 
The researcher used a t-Test-Paired Two Sample for Means 
to analyze the data. A .05 level of significance was used to 
determine whether to accept or reject Hypothesis 2: It was 
determined that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between the annual salaries of the CEOs of 48 publically 
traded firms in the State of Wisconsin, USA and 
increases/decreases in the net revenues of their corporations in 
2008. With a P (T<=t) two-tail value of .48 at the .05 level, the 
Null Hypothesis cannot be rejected (Table 2). 
 
Table 2.  Correlation of CEO Compensation to Net Revenue 
2008 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample 
for Means    N= 48 
Results 
P(T<=t) two-tail .48 
  
 
C. Findings: Hypothesis 3 
 
The researcher used a t-Test-Paired Two Sample for Means 
to analyze the data. A .05 level of significance was used to 
determine whether to accept or reject Hypothesis 3: It was 
determined that there is no correlation between the annual 
salaries of the CEOs of 48 publically traded firms in the State 
of Wisconsin, USA and increases/decreases in the price of 
their corporations’ stock prices in 2010. With a P (T<=t) two-
tail value of 1.91 at the .05 level, the Null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Correlation of CEO Compensation to Stock 
Price 2010 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample 






D. Findings: Hypothesis 4 
 
The researcher used a t-Test-Paired Two Sample for Means 
to analyze the data. A .05 level of significance was used to 
determine whether to accept or reject Hypothesis 3: It was 
determined that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the annual salaries of the CEOs of 48 publically 
traded firms in the State of Wisconsin, USA and 
increases/decreases in the net revenues of their corporations in 
2010. With a P(T<=t) two-tail value of.04 at the .05 level, the 
P value is sufficient to not accept the Null Hypothesis and 
accept the Alternative Hypothesis (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Correlation of CEO Compensation 
to Net Revenue 2010 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample 





E. Analysis of 2008 Results 
The purpose of this quantitative research project was to 
investigate to what extent if any a relationship existed between 
the annual salaries of the CEOs of 48 publically traded firms 
in the State of Wisconsin, USA and increases/decreases in the 
price of their corporations’ stock prices and net revenues. The 
results indicated that there was  no statistically significant 
relationship between CEO salary and increases or decreases in 
either the stock price or net revenues of their firms. Upon 
closer analysis of annual net corporate earnings in 2008, 
Wisconsin’s publically traded corporations averaged a decline 
in net revenue of $5,661,042. Clearly the devastating blows of 
the Great Recession severely bashed the income streams of 
nearly every industry sector. While every Wisconsin firm did 
not record losses in 2008, on average one would expect to see 
a concomitant CEO salary adjustment given the dire economic 
prospects of the national economy. However between 2007 –
’08 approximately 55% of Wisconsin CEOs received pay 
increases. The argument could be made that CEOs must work 
even harder during difficult economic times to mitigate the 
negative effects of declining business and therefore CEOs 
deserve pay increases. Apparently some compensation 
committees applied this logic to their remuneration decisions 
in 2007 - 2008. However, despite the onset of one of the most 
serious economic downturns in modern American history and 
future financial forecasts predicting continuous decline, more 
than half of the CEOs received pay increases. The statistical 
evidence indicates that regardless of corporate outcome, the 
connection between CEO pay and firm performance was 
unremarkable. 
 
F. Analysis of 2010 Results 
Economic conditions changed from late 2007 to 2010. The 
Great Recession officially ended in 2009. The statistical 
analysis of CEO compensation and firm net revenue and stock 
prices yielded mixed results. Even though no statistically 
significant relationship was noted between the annual salaries 
of CEOs and increases/decreases in their firms’ stock prices in 
2010 there was a strong correlation between salaries and net 
revenues. This phenomenon does have grounding in the real 
economy. While the price of a company’s stock price varies 
from minute to minute based on innumerable analytical and 
qualitative reasons, the production of products and services 
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and management of a corporation’s resources are controllable 
economic choices made by the CEO. These sorts of bottom 
line selections can be assessed and traced to the enterprise’s 
CEO and in 2010 the average compensation for Wisconsin 
corporate CEOs increased by 27%.   
 
IV.    Conclusion 
 
This research study sought to investigate to what extent if 
any a relationship existed between the annual salaries of the 
CEOs of 48 publically traded firms in the State of Wisconsin, 
USA and increases/decreases in the value of their 
corporations’ stock prices and net revenues. The outcomes of 
this research showed that there was no statistically significant 
correlation between the compensation of corporate executives 
of 48 publically traded companies in the state of Wisconsin 
and the net incomes and stock prices of their entities in 2008. 
However, in 2010 while there was no statistically significant 
correlation between the compensation of corporate executives 
of 48 publically traded firms in the state of Wisconsin and the 
price of their firms’ stock prices in 2010, there was a 
statistically significant correlation between the compensation 
of these executives and the net incomes of their corporations. 
This study was conducted comparing the beginning of one 
of the worst recessions in modern American history from late 
2007 to a post-recession period in 2010.  While many 
Wisconsin firms were buffeted by the economic maelstrom of 
the Great Recession, all 48 of the CEOs that were the subjects 
of this micro-study survived this period and as noted, on 
average received generous pay increases in 2010.  
In the final analysis, this study needs to be repeated on an 
annual basis to continue to monitor trends. Additional analysis 
should be directed at discerning if the size of the workforce is 
increased in direct proportion to the success of a company. 
Furthermore in-depth research should be focused on 
determining if there is rough equivalence in pay between 
Wisconsin’s male and female executives.  Finally the assertion 
that the actions of a lone CEO can be directly linked to their 
firm’s stock price and net earnings continues to require 
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